Business and Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Areas: Heightened Due Diligence, International Humanitarian Law and Criminal Liability Risks

Why conflict-affected areas raise distinct requirements

In armed conflict and other situations of widespread violence, the risk of gross human rights abuses is particularly high. Principle 7 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights is therefore addressed to States. They should engage with business enterprises at the earliest stage possible, help them assess heightened risks, pay special attention to both gender-based and sexual violence, and deny access to public support and services to enterprises involved in gross abuses that refuse to cooperate.

For companies themselves, Principle 23 is central. Under letter (c), they should treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate. The commentary identifies conflict-affected areas as environments that may increase the risk of being complicit in abuses committed by other actors, such as security forces. It points to extraterritorial civil claims and to jurisdictions that have incorporated the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and provide for corporate criminal responsibility. Directors, officers and employees may also be subject to individual liability.

Heightened due diligence under the UNDP guide

This is made concrete in "Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts", a guide published in 2022 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and edited with the participation of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. Its core point: companies assess not only their impacts on people but also their impacts on the conflict itself.

The guide describes four processes: identifying and assessing adverse impacts on conflict and human rights, acting to cease or prevent them, and tracking and communicating the measures taken. In practice this means:

1. Understand the context: carry out a conflict analysis and update it regularly.
2. Understand the interaction: link the conflict analysis with the cycle of the company's own business activities.
3. Understand the human rights impact: carry out a human rights impact assessment.
4. Act: plan, implement, monitor and evaluate activities so that negative impacts are avoided or mitigated.

According to the guide, heightened due diligence applies in armed conflict, military occupation, mass atrocities and other situations of widespread violence. Its rule of thumb: if in doubt, carry it out.

Exit is also part of due diligence. According to the guide, a hasty exit may be as damaging as one that comes too late. Its example: people who depended financially on the business may be forced to join an armed group as a means of subsistence after an early exit. An exit strategy should therefore ideally be planned at the same time as the start of activity.

International humanitarian law as an additional standard

In situations of armed conflict, the UNDP guide states that businesses should consider at a minimum international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Citing the International Committee of the Red Cross, it notes that international humanitarian law applies to business activities linked to hostilities, for instance where a company provides support to a party to the conflict. It then also imposes obligations on managers and staff; breaches may give rise to criminal or civil liability, including as accomplices.

In Germany, the Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, VStGB) applies to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes even where the offence was committed abroad and has no link to Germany (section 1 VStGB). Under section 30 of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG), a fine may be imposed on a legal person where a person in a management position has committed a criminal offence that violated the company's duties or was intended to enrich it. For intentional offences, the fine is up to EUR 10 million. The Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG) expressly covers the use of security forces where, owing to a lack of instruction or control, torture or injury to life or limb occurs (section 2(2) no. 11). According to the BAFA guidance on risk analysis, the outbreak of a conflict in a country of operation is an occasion for reviewing risks on an ad hoc basis.

The Lafarge judgment of 13 April 2026

How concrete these risks can become is shown by the judgment of the 16th criminal chamber of the Tribunal judiciaire de Paris of 13 April 2026. According to the court's press release, the Lafarge group operated a cement plant in Jalabiya in northern Syria through its Syrian subsidiary until the plant was taken by the "Islamic State" in September 2014. The court found nine defendants, including Lafarge SA as a legal person, guilty of financing a terrorist enterprise under Article 421-2-2 of the French Criminal Code, and five of them also of breaching international restrictions on economic and financial relations. The offences were committed mainly in 2013 and 2014.

According to the court's findings, EUR 5,593,897 was paid to three armed groups that the court classified as terrorist: as so-called security payments for the free movement of staff and materials, as remuneration of intermediaries, as transit fees and as payments to suppliers they controlled. According to the court, the offence does not require adherence to terrorist ideology; what mattered was knowledge of the purpose for which the funds were used. According to AFP reports, the court imposed on Lafarge SA the maximum fine of EUR 1.125 million and, jointly with four former executives, a customs fine of EUR 4.57 million. According to the press release, the judicial investigation into complicity in crimes against humanity is continuing.

According to an AFP report of 28 April 2026, Lafarge SA and all other convicted defendants have lodged an appeal. The judgment is therefore not final.

What companies typically review

1. Is there a current conflict analysis for each country of operation and sourcing with heightened risk?
2. Have payments to third parties, for instance for security, transit or brokerage, been checked for their recipients and their connections, including against sanctions lists?
3. Are there escalation routes up to senior management and a prepared exit strategy?

This post provides a general overview of the legal position and does not replace legal advice on individual cases.

← All posts